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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I could not imagine then, that the time would come when the 
power of detention, carefully and deliberately interlocked with 
Article 149 of the Constitution, would be used against political 
opponents, welfare workers and others dedicated to nonviolent, 
peaceful activities.”1   
So wrote the British lawyer Hugh Hickling, architect of the Internal 
Security Act (ISA).2  Originally enacted over fifty years ago in the British 
colony of Malaya in order to combat a Communist insurgency, the ISA was 
used for decades to repress the civil rights of Malaysians.3   
From 1960 to 2012, the Malaysian government and its ruling party used the 
act and its powers of endless detention to their utmost limits to silence political 
dissidents and government opponents.4  Although the ISA gained brief 
legitimacy as Western nations enacted similar preventive detention laws in the 
wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001,5 in 2011 the wave of 
public sentiment against the ISA reached critical mass, spurred on largely by 
the capricious and extrajudicial nature of high profile detentions.6  These 
detentions of leading public figures both incensed and emboldened the public, 
while simultaneously increasing awareness of the extensive powers granted to 
the Executive branch of the Malaysian government by the ISA.7  Following the 
extensive public outcry about the ISA and its use, the current Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, Najib Razak, bowed to the wishes of the people on September 15, 
2011, in a Malaysia Day8 speech.9  He announced the end of the ISA, and the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Obituary, Professor Hugh Hickling, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 17, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/news/obituaries/1548788/Professor-Hugh-Hickling.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 U.S. Dep’t of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Malaysia, Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.sta 
te.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135998.htm [hereinafter 2009 Human Rights Report]. 
 5 Victor V. Ramraj, Terrorism, Security and Rights: A New Dialogue, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 11–13. 
 6 Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia’s Internal Security Act, 26 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1345, 1349–52 (2003). 
 7 Id. 
 8 A Malaysian public holiday celebrating the formation of the Malaysian Federation (the 
union of Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo territories) in 1963.  See, e.g., Yeng Ai Chun, 
Malaysia Day Not a Public Holiday, Says PM, STAR, Oct. 19, 2009, http://thestar.com.my/ne 
ws/story.asp?file=/2009/10/19/nation/20091019103509&sec=nation. 
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reworking of its provisions into two new laws that would protect the people 
and also uphold civil liberties.10  It seemed like the day that all of Malaysia had 
been waiting for: a new era of justice and liberty beginning with the end of this 
draconian law.  However, the promise of increased civil liberties that seemed 
inherent in a repeal of this hated law has not borne out.   
With much fanfare, the ISA was repealed in April 2012, and replaced by 
the two new laws that Najib promised.11  Rather than eliminating the 
practices that made the ISA so controversial, the new laws have codified the 
worst of its abuses, and as a result, use of these new laws may lead to even 
further injustice.12  The history of systematic oppression that has existed 
since Malaysian independence in 1957 continues even as the Malaysian 
government boasts of its reformist credentials.  Therefore the critical 
question on the future of Malaysia is not when specific laws will be repealed, 
or whether they will be replaced, because the Malaysian government has 
already done so.  The critical question is what can be done to ensure that 
what replaces repealed laws like the ISA will foster civil liberties and 
contribute to the end of the practices that have so marred Malaysia’s political 
and social history. 
To answer that question this Note will first emphasize the need for a 
complete reworking of the ISA in light of the injustice perpetrated by the 
Malaysian government when using this act, then assess the prospect of a 
revised ISA that reflects a balance between freedom and security, and finally, 
detail steps to ensure new security laws, such as those that replaced the ISA, 
are used in a limited and just manner.  Part II will review the creation of the 
ISA and other preventive detention laws, discuss the constitutional and 
judicial postures in relation to these types of laws, recount the events that led 
to the repeal of the ISA, and discuss the failures of the new “reform” laws 
passed by the Malaysian legislature.  Part III will review and analyze 
Singapore’s legal posture on preventive detention and the use of its own ISA 
(copied from Malaysia), and will also review an example of preventive 
detention law reform from Canada.  Part IV will advocate for reform of 
                                                                                                                   
 9 PM Announces Repeal of ISA, Three Emergency Proclamations, STAR, Sept. 15, 2011, 
available at http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/9/15/nation/20110915205714&sec 
=nation [hereinafter PM Announces Repeal of ISA]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 New Bill to Replace ISA, STAR, Apr. 10, 2012, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/ 
2012/4/10/nation/11077372&sec=nation. 
 12 Mickey Spiegel, Smoke and Mirrors: Malaysia’s “New” Internal Security Act, ASIA PAC. 
BULL., June 14, 2012, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb167_0.pdf. 
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preventive detention laws in Malaysia by suggesting constitutional changes 
and other methods to improve Malaysian civil liberties.  Finally, Part V will 
provide concluding remarks, reemphasizing the importance of a new 
approach to civil liberties in Malaysia. 
II.  THE BACKGROUND OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN MALAYSIA 
A.  The Internal Security Act 
In 1948, the British colonial government of Malaya responded to a 
Communist insurgency by declaring a state of emergency and drafting the 
Internal Security Act under the auspices of the Emergency Regulations 
Ordinance, thereby giving colonial authorities the power to arrest and detain 
without trial anyone they believed to be involved in anti-government 
action.13  The declared state of emergency was not lifted until July 31, 
1960,14 three years after Malaysia’s independence from Britain.15  The 
government was still fearful of the persistent Communist insurgency 
however, and did not want to give up the power of preventive detention, 
which it believed was still needed to continue the fight against the ongoing 
threat.16  In the place of the laws passed during the emergency, and to ensure 
that the “Government [did] not . . . relax its vigilance against the evil enemy 
who still remains as a threat on [the] border,”17 the Malaysian government 
re-enacted the British ISA through the Internal Security Act 1960.  The Act’s 
stated purpose being “to provide for the internal security of Malaysia, 
preventive detention, the prevention of subversion, the suppression of 
organized violence against persons and property in specified areas of 
Malaysia, and for matters incidental thereto.”18  Although the first Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, promised the nation the law 
                                                                                                                   
 13 BARBARA WATSON ANDAYA & LEONARD Y. ANDAYA, A HISTORY OF MALAYSIA 271 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
 14 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF MALAYSIA, REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT 1960, 
at 3 (2003), http://www.suhakam.org.my/c/document_library/get_file?p_l_id=22118&folderId= 
26482&name=DLFE-1501.pdf. 
 15 ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 13, at 277. 
 16 Tommy Thomas, Human Rights in 21st Century Malaysia: The Executive and the 
Legislature, ALIRAN ONLINE, available at http://aliran.com/archives/hr/tt1.html (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2012) (during presentment of the Bill, Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak stated 
“there was still a need for the people ‘to be protected from communists [sic] subversion’ ”). 
 17 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF MALAYSIA, supra note 14. 
 18 Internal Security Act 1960, Preamble (Malay. 1960). 
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would only be used against Communists, the text of the Act makes no 
mention of this.19  Rather, the requirements for triggering preventive 
detention are embodied in general language, allowing it to be used against 
any group that the Malaysian Parliament believes presents a threat to the 
security of Malaysia.20   
As discussed below, the Internal Security Act was the main legal tool 
used by the Malaysian government to suppress civil liberties in Malaysia 
until its repeal in April 2012.21  The use and interpretation of this law 
throughout Malaysian history is an excellent lens through which to examine 
the preventive detention framework in Malaysia, and is a good indicator of 
how the Malaysian government will interpret these types of laws in the 
future, including the new “reform” laws that are being enacted. 
B.  Constitutional Impediments to True Civil Liberties 
The Malaysian Constitution, on its face, purports to be a progressive 
document guaranteeing due process of law,22 freedom from arbitrary 
detention,23 equal protection,24 freedom of speech and assembly,25 and 
freedom of religion.26  Examining only these articles in the Constitution, it is 
hard to believe that a law such as the ISA exists, let alone that it is routinely 
used to subvert these rights.  However, the Constitution contains three very 
important articles which allow Parliament to disregard any of these rights, or 
any other article of the Constitution, under certain conditions. 
                                                                                                                   
 19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABDICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY: THE COMMONWEALTH AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (1991).  
The ISA introduced in 1960 was designed and meant to be used solely against 
the communists.  My cabinet colleagues and I gave a solemn promise to 
Parliament and the nation that the immense powers given to the government 
under the ISA would never be used to stifle legitimate opposition and silence 
lawful dissent. 
Id.  
 20 See Internal Security Act 1960, Preamble, supra note 18. 
 21 See infra Part II.E (discussing how the Malaysian government used the ISA, and the 
public’s response). 
 22 MALAY. CONST. art. 5(1). 
 23 Id. art. 5(2)–(4). 
 24 Id. art. 8. 
 25 Id. art. 10. 
 26 Id. art. 11. 
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Article 150 allows the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Sultan) to declare a state 
of emergency.27  During this state of emergency, the executive power 
“extend[s] to any matter within the legislative authority of a State,”28 the 
Parliament is given the power to “make laws with respect to any matter, if it 
appears to Parliament that the law is required by reason of the emergency,”29 
and the judicial branch is stripped of all powers of judicial review.30  This 
Article has been invoked by the Sultan four times since independence:31 in 
September 1964, as a result of a conflict with Indonesia, who protested the 
formation of Malaysia;32 in September 1966 after the dismissal of the Chief 
Minister of one of the Malaysian states and the resulting constitutional 
impasse;33 in May 1969, in the aftermath of widespread racial riots and 
violence in the capital of Kuala Lumpur;34 and in November 1977 after 
another constitutional crisis where a Chief Minister refused to step down 
after a vote of no confidence.35  What is astonishing about these declarations 
of emergency is how long they have lasted.  Najib promised in his speech 
that the emergency declarations would be revoked,36 and on November 24, 
2011, the Parliament revoked three of them.37  Strangely, only the emergency 
declarations relating to the May 13, 1969, riots and the two constitutional 
crises (from 1966 and 1977) were explicitly lifted.38  The earliest state of 
emergency relating to the conflict with Indonesia, declared in September 
1964, is arguably still in effect although the Malaysian government claims 
that it had been implicitly revoked by the Emergency Proclamation 1969, a 
view propogated by the Privy Council of the United Kingdom in Teh Cheng 
                                                                                                                   
 27 Id. art. 150(1). 
 28 Id. art. 150(4). 
 29 Id. art. 150(5). 
 30 Id. art. 150(8)(b). 
 31 Kevin Y.L. Tan, From Myanmar to Manila: A Brief Study of Emergency Powers in 
Southeast Asia, in EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 149, 
182–83 (Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010). 
 32 Id. at 182. 
 33 Id. at 183. 
 34 Id.  The riots led to an official body count of 196 dead and 409 injured (estimated to be far 
lower than the actual count), with most of the victims being Chinese, and the homes and property 
of 6000 mostly Chinese residents destroyed, ANDAYA & ANDAYA, supra note 13, at 298. 
 35 Tan, supra note 31, at 183. 
 36 PM Announces Repeal of ISA, supra note 9. 
 37 History Made as EOs Lifted, STAR, Nov. 25, 2011, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp 
?file=/2011/11/25/parliament/9973697&sec=parliament. 
 38 Id. (specifically, Emergency Proclamation 1969 (Malay.); Emergency Proclamation 1966 
(Malay.); Emergency Proclamation 1977 (Malay.)). 
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Poh v. Public Prosecutor.39  However, this interpretation is suspect for two 
reasons: first, the Malaysian government abolished appeals to the Privy 
Council on criminal and constitutional issues in 1978 and Malaysian courts 
do not consider themselves bound by Privy Council decisions;40 and second, 
Malaysia passed a constitutional amendment allowing for concurrent states 
of emergency and disallowing judicial review of emergency proclamations in 
1981.41  This history leaves significant room for the argument that the 
Emergency Proclamation of 1964 is still in effect, and future administrations 
may very well take this position.42   
Regardless of the current status of the states of emergency, they existed 
for decades, serving to justify the creation and use of repressive laws and 
practices such as the ISA,43 and the government can ask the Sultan to declare 
a new state of emergency at any time due to the continued validity of Article 
150.44 
Article 151 purports to put a safeguard on the use of preventive 
detention.45  It requires that a detainee be informed of the grounds for his 
detention and the facts which support those grounds.46  However, section (3) 
states that this rule “does not require any authority to disclose facts whose 
disclosure would in its opinion be against the national interest.”47  This is not 
much of a safeguard because the grounds for detention could be almost 
anything and there is no judicial review of the reasonableness of the 
grounds.48  Therefore, this article has almost no real effect on the use of the 
ISA. 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458 (P.C. 1978) (appeal taken from 
Malay.).  The Privy Council was formerly the highest court of appeal for cases from Malaysia 
and other former British colonies. 
 40 Sharifah Suhanah Syed Ahmad, Introduction to the Sources of Law in Malaysia, 40 INT’L 
J. LEGAL INFO. 174, 185–86 (2012).  
 41 Constitution (Amendment) Act 1981 (Malay.). 
 42 E.g., Lim Kit Siang, Parliamentary Opposition Leader & DAP Secretary-General, Motion 
to Revoke the Three Emergency Proclamations of 1966, 1969 and 1977 (June 28, 1979), 
available at http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/11/25/i-have-been-waiting-for-the-revocation-of-th 
e-three-emergency-proclamations-for-the-past-30-to-40-years/. 
 43 Tan, supra note 31, at 183. 
 44 Public Prosecutors v. Mohd Amin Mohd Razali [2000] 4 MLJ 679, 679 (reaffirming the 
Sultan’s power to issue emergency proclamations under Article 150). 
 45 See generally MALAY. CONST., supra note 22, art. 151. 
 46 Id. art. 151(1)(a). 
 47 Id. art. 151(3). 
 48 See Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989, § 2(8B) (Malay.) (eliminating judicial 
review of ISA detentions). 
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Both of these Articles demonstrate the ease with which a law like the ISA 
can be abused, but Article 149 is the key article that allows for the existence 
of laws restricting civil liberties and bars any question of their 
constitutionality.49  Article 149 states that any law is valid, regardless of 
whether it conflicts with constitutional guarantees,50 if the law seeks to stop 
or prevent action that may jeopardize society in one of the following ways: 
(a) to cause, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to fear, 
organised violence against persons or property; or 
(b) to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or 
any Government in the Federation; or 
(c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between 
different races or other classes of the population likely to cause 
violence; or 
(d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, 
of anything by law established; or 
(e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the functioning 
of any supply or service to the public or any class of the public 
in the Federation or any part thereof; or 
(f) which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of, the 
Federation or any part thereof . . . .51 
These are highly subjective factors that can be used to describe almost 
any activity by the citizens of Malaysia.  Sections (b), (c), (d), and (f) seem 
particularly appropriate for suppressing protests and clamping down on 
criticism of the government.  Any comments about the government, religion, 
or ethnicity can be found to excite disaffection against the government or 
promote feelings of ill-will between different races or classes.52  Section (f) 
is the most nebulous and subjective, as any action that a government 
                                                                                                                   
 49 See generally MALAY. CONST., supra note 22, art. 149. 
 50 Specifically, regardless of the law’s conflict with Articles 5 (due process), 9 (freedom 
from banishment), 10 (freedom of speech, assembly, and association), or 13 (right to 
property); id. arts. 5, 9, 10, 13.  
 51 MALAY. CONST., supra note 22, art. 149(1)(a)–(f). 
 52 See Johan Saravanamuttu, Operation Lalang Revisited: A Call for the Repeal of ISA, 
ALIRAN MONTHLY, no. 8, 2008; JOHN HILLEY, MALAYSIA: MAHATHIRISM, HEGEMONY AND THE 
NEW OPPOSITION 88–89 (2001); Karpal Singh v. Minister for Home Affairs, [1988] 1 MLJ 
468, 470–71 (H.C. Malay.). 
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authority does not like could be labeled “prejudicial to public order.”53  As 
demonstrated by the examples provided below, even the most mundane 
comments can trigger an ISA detention if they are said to certain people, or 
in a certain forum, or concerning a certain subject.54  Under these provisions, 
even a verbal insult could be grounds for ISA detention if it sufficiently 
offends someone in power.55 
C.  The Subjectivity Standard and the Role of the Judiciary 
There is a recurring theme in the Malaysian Constitution and the 
provisions discussed above: subjectivity.  As will be discussed, the laws 
based on Article 149 have been interpreted through the common law as 
reviewable only under a subjective standard.56  This subjective standard of 
government detention actions comes from the seminal UK case of Liversidge 
v. Anderson, which addressed a law very similar in nature to the ISA, where 
the “personal belief” of a state official that someone is engaged in prohibited 
activity was held to be sufficient to detain that individual.57  In Liversidge, a 
man was imprisoned on orders of the Home Minister for his “hostile 
associations,” and demanded his freedom.58  A split court decided that the 
legality of the detention must be judged by a subjective standard, seen from 
the point of view of the authority ordering the detention rather than from the 
objective perspective of law.59  Although Britain has since drifted away from 
the subjective standard established in this case and towards the objective 
standard voiced by Lord Atkins’s powerful dissent,60 Malaysia and 
                                                                                                                   
 53 See Media Statement, Lim Kit Siang, Democratic Action Party Parliamentary Leader, 
Suhakam Has Failed Its Statutory Charter to Protect and Promote Human Rights When It 
Becomes a Government Apologist for Human Rights Violations as Trying to Justify Abdullah’s 
Threat to Use the Sedition Act Against “Those who Continue Harping on the Government’s 
Decision to Use English to Teach Science and Mathematics in School” (Nov. 16, 2002) 
[hereinafter Media Statement, Lim Kit Siang], available at http://dapmalaysia.org/all-archive/En 
glish/2002/nov02/lks/lks1929.htm; see also sources cited supra note 52.  
 54 See sources cited supra note 53. 
 55 See Joseph Sipalan, National Laureate Probed over ‘Seditious Poem,’ Malaysiakini (June 
27, 2011, 8:44 AM), http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2011/06/28/national-laureate-probed-over-sedit 
ious-poem/.  Malaysiakini is the official website of Lim Kit Siang, the leader of the opposition 
Democratic Party. 
 56 Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [Minister of Home Affairs], [1969] 2 
MLJ 129, 139 (Malay.). 
 57 Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] AC 206 (H.L.), [9] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 58 Id. at [4]. 
 59 Id. at [9]. 
 60 Id. at [10]–[23]. 
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Singapore have strongly embraced the subjective standard of the majority 
decision.61  Malaysia’s highest court, the Federal Court,62 first took the 
opportunity to endorse the outcome of Liversidge in 1969, in the case of 
Karam Singh v. Minister of Home Affairs.63  Karam Singh was detained on 
the personal orders of Tun Abdul Razak, the Minister of Home Affairs and 
also the Deputy Prime Minister at the time (and the father of Prime Minister 
Najib), because of Singh’s membership in a Communist organization.64  This 
detention was appealed to the Federal Court, which unequivocally upheld the 
Liversidge standard.65  The Court stated that as the detention “deal[s] with 
matters within the province of national policy in relation to the security of 
the nation the subjective satisfaction of the Cabinet on those allegations 
cannot be substituted by an objective test in a court of law.”66 
Eventually though, Malaysia’s courts began to question the subjective 
standard.  In 1988, the Federal Court decided Re Tan Sri Raja Harun, in 
which a bank fund managing director was arrested under the ISA for alleged 
financial improprieties that the government believed would cause public 
unrest and organized violence.67  In releasing him under a writ of habeas 
corpus, the court explicitly challenged the ISA, stating “it is settled law that 
any exercise of power under a statute is subject to judicial review to ensure 
that the scope and limits of the power were not exceeded.”68  However, the 
court still endorsed the subjective standard within the text of the opinion.69  
In 1989, in Minister of Home Affairs v. Othman, the Federal Court released a 
man detained under the ISA who had allegedly been attempting to convert 
Muslims to Christianity.70  The Court disregarded the subjective opinion of 
the Minister for Home Affairs and found that the actions of the detainee 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Karam Singh, 2 MLJ at 139; Lee Mau Seng v. Minister of Home Affairs, [1971] SGHC 
10 (Sing.). 
 62 The highest Court of Malaysia was called the Supreme Court from 1985 to 1994.  
Although some cases that will be discussed came from the “Supreme Court” era, for 
consistency and clarity, this Court will be referred to as the “Federal Court” throughout this 
Note.  Office of the Chief Registrar Federal Court of Malaysia, History of the Malaysian 
Judiciary, http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/?q=en/node/410 (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
 63 Karam Singh, 2 MLJ at 139.  
 64 Id. at 130–31. 
 65 Id. at 139. 
 66 Id. at 134. 
 67 Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid Bin Raja Harun, [1988] 1 MLJ 182, 182 (Malay.). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 186–87. 
 70 Minister for Home Affairs v. Othman, [1989] 1 MLJ 418, 419 (Malay.). 
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could in no way have caused a threat to national security and therefore, he 
could not legally be held under the ISA.71 
Another case at this time involving a split between the trial court and the 
Federal Court on the issue of the subjective versus objective standard was 
Karpal Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [Minister for Home 
Affairs].72  The detainee, a member of the Malaysian Parliament, made 
disparaging comments about a rumored government plan to use non-
Mandarin speaking teachers in Chinese schools.73  In a foreshadowing to the 
way the ISA would later be used, especially in the 2000s, the Prime Minister 
at the time, Mahathir Mohamad, ordered Singh detained under the ISA for 
being “involved in activities that would incite racial sentiments amongst the 
multi-racial community of this country.”74  The trial court found that 
although the reason for the Prime Minister’s decision could not be reviewed 
objectively, the order itself could be.75  Finding the order was incorrect as to 
one point, and thus made in a bad faith manner, the judge ordered the 
detainee freed.76  The Federal Court disagreed.77  They found that regardless 
of the bad faith nature of the order, the trial court judge could not inquire into 
the cause of the detention and plainly erred when he applied an objective 
standard.78  Save for the few hours he was released after the trial court’s 
judgment, the detainee was held from October 1987 until January 1989 for 
his comments.79  It seemed the Federal Court decided anew that, as they 
stated in the ISA detention case of Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector 
General of Police, the “judges in the matter of preventive detention[s] . . . are 
the [officers of the] executive [branch].”80 
The questioning of the subjective standard by the courts in these cases 
was met with strong resistance from the Prime Minister and the ruling party 
of Parliament.  In 1988 and 1989, the Parliament responded by drafting two 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Id.  
 72 Karpal Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [Minister for Home Affairs], [1988] 1 
MLJ 468 (Malay.). 
 73 Id. at 470–71. 
 74 Id. at 470. 
 75 Id. at 471. 
 76 Id. at 474. 
 77 Minister for Home Affairs v. Karpal Singh, [1988] 3 MLJ 29, 32 (Malay.). 
 78 Id. at 31. 
 79 NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 June 2002, 3263 (Paul Gibson, 
Member) (Austl.), available at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/ 
V3Key/LA20020618035. 
 80 IMTIAZ OMAR, RIGHTS, EMERGENCIES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 54 (1996) (quoting Theresa 
Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector General of Police, [1988] 1 MLJ 293, 294 (Malay.)). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013 2:29 PM 




amendments to the ISA and a Constitutional amendment.81  The first 
amendment, passed in 1988, prohibited any suit or action filed because of 
procedural defects in an ISA detention order, the manner in which the order 
was served, or the manner of detention.82  Detained prisoners no longer had 
the option of appealing to the courts on the basis of incorrect procedure,83 
closing the bad faith loophole found by the trial court in Singh. 
The second amendment, passed under the Internal Security (Amendment) 
Act 1989, did far more than close procedural loopholes; it permanently 
eliminated the power of judicial review over ISA detentions.84  The supplied 
definitions of judicial review included writs of mandamus, certiorari, and 
habeas corpus.85 
It was the Constitutional Amendment Act, however, that had the biggest 
impact on the court system of Malaysia, in 1988 and today.  The 
Constitutional (Amendment) Act 1988 removed the concept of a judicial 
power naturally and constitutionally vested in the Malaysian courts and 
instead made all judicial powers subject to the Executive Branch.86  This 
amendment was intended by the Parliament to curtail what they saw as 
judiciary abuse of power and to codify the supremacy of the Parliament and 
the Prime Minister, and by extension the ruling party.87  The judiciary was no 
longer able to interfere with the executive power and “intrude upon the 
government’s mandate to enact laws.”88  The judiciary accepted that this 
amendment eliminated its separate judicial power, not even questioning this 
interpretation until ten years later. Then in 2007, the judiciary confirmed that 
the amendment had stripped the courts of their original constitutional 
                                                                                                                   
 81 Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1988 (Malay.); The Internal Security (Amendment) 
Act 1989 (Malay.); Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988 (Malay.).  
 82 Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1988, supra note 81, §§ 3, 5.   
 83 Id.   
 84 Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989, supra note 48, § 2(8B) (“There shall be no 
judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect 
of, any act done or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the 
exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with [the ISA].”). 
 85 Id. § 2(8C). 
 86 Richard S.K. Foo, Malaysia – Death of a Separate Constitutional Judicial Power, 2010 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 229, 232–33 (quoting Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988, supra 
note 81, § 8). 
 87 Id. at 229–30. 
 88 Id. at 231. 
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jurisdiction and the only powers and jurisdiction the court possessed were 
those conferred by federal law.89 
The amendments to the ISA and the Constitution discussed above put an 
end to judicial review of the ISA.  As a result, the executive proceeded to use 
the ISA with impunity throughout the 1990s and 2000s.90   
D.  Other Malaysian Detention Laws That Have Been Used in Conjunction 
with the ISA 
Although the ISA has been the law most often used—and is the law seen 
as the most egregious by Malaysian civil society91—it is not the only law that 
has been used in Malaysia for the purposes of preventive detention.  The 
Sedition Act 1948 and the Emergency Ordinance 1969 have also been 
frequently used.92   
The Sedition Act criminalizes any statements made with “seditious 
tendency,” and clarifies this term with definitions similar to the provisions of 
Article 149, including the catch all provisions prohibiting “exciting 
disaffection” against the government93 or the administration of justice,94 or 
“promot[ing] feelings of ill will and hostility between different races or 
classes.”95  This act, which allows for warrantless arrests,96 has often been 
used to silence opposition parties and people who question government 
policies.  For example, in 2002 Prime Minister Badawi threatened use of the 
act on members of Parliament who disagreed with the official government 
                                                                                                                   
 89 Id. at 231–32 (citing Sugumar Balakrishnan v. Pengrareh Imigresen Negen Sabah 
[Minister for Immigration], [1998] 3 MLJ 289, 307–08 (Malay.) (claiming that the 
amendment had not removed Constitutional judicial power from the courts) and Public 
Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan, [2008] 1 MLJ 1, 14–15, 17–18 (Malay.) (holding that the 
judiciary possesses only the powers given by federal law, and the Constitution did not 
establish separation of powers)). 
 90 Simon Ingram, Malaysia’s Fearsome Security Law, BBC NEWS, July 4, 2001, http://ne 
ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1420739.stm; 2009 Human Rights Report, supra note 4. 
 91 Ingram, supra note 90. 
 92 See, e.g., Malaysian Teacher Charged with Sedition, BBC NEWS, Aug. 9, 2001, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1481659.stm; More Arrests Possible Under Emergency 
Ordinance, FREE MALAYSIA TODAY, July 3, 2011, available at http://www.freemalaysiatoday. 
com/2011/07/03/more-arrests-possible-under-emergency-ordinance/; Bernard Cheah, Repeal 
Emergency Ordinance: Report, SUN, Aug. 25, 2006, available at http://www.malaysianbar. 
org.my/human_rights/repeal_emergency_ordinance_report.html. 
 93 Sedition Act 1948, § 3(1)(a) (Malay.). 
 94 Id. § 3(1)(c). 
 95 Id. § 3. 
 96 Id. § 11. 
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policy of using English to teach science and math in school.97  It was also 
used to arrest a political cartoonist who satirized the Malaysian 
government,98 and recently in the Bersih 2.0 protests, when a septuagenarian 
poet was interrogated for ninety minutes over the content of poetry read at 
the event.99  The Emergency Ordinance, providing for preventive detention 
up to two years for people found “acting in any manner prejudicial to public 
order,”100 has also been used in a way similar to the ISA as recently as June 
2011 to detain six members of a socialist party who took part in the Bersih 
2.0 street protests.101 
While the Emergency Ordinance has been repealed as part of the lifting of 
the May 1969 state of emergency to which it was linked,102 the Sedition Act 
is currently still in force.  However, even though its validity was recently 
reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal103 and Najib has previously stated “the 
government has no plans of repealing the Sedition Act 1948 as the legislation 
is still relevant to safeguard national security and harmony,”104 Najib 
recently announced that it will also be repealed.105  The law will be replaced 
however, by the suspiciously named “National Harmony Act,” which will, in 
the words of Najib, “help to strengthen national cohesion by protecting 
national unity and nurturing religious harmony”106 and “balance the right of 
freedom of expression as enshrined in the Constitution, while at the same 
time ensuring that all races and religions are protected.”107  Whether these 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Media Statement, Lim Kit Siang, supra note 53. 
 98 Detained Malaysian Cartoonist Vows to Carry on, CHINA POST (Sept. 26, 2010), available 
at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/malaysia/2010/09/26/273928/Detained-Malaysian.htm. 
 99 Sipalan, supra note 55. 
 100 Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 § 4(1) (Malay. 1969). 
 101 Jeswan Kaur, Taking It out on Rakyat for Backing Bersih, FREE MALAYSIA TODAY (July 22, 
2011), available at http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/2011/07/22/taking-it-out-on-rakya t-for-b 
acking-bersih/. 
 102 History Made as EOs Lifted, supra note 37. 
 103 Sedition Act 1948 a Valid Law, Says Court of Appeal, STAR, Feb. 24, 2012, http://thestar. 
com.my/metro/story.asp?sec=nation&file=/2012/2/24/nation/20120224175444. 
 104 Tarani Palani, Sedition Act Won’t Be Repealed, FREE MALAYSIA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2012), 
available at http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2012/04/09/sedition-act-wont-b 
e-repealed/. 
 105 Najib: Sedition Act to Be Repealed, MALAYSIAN INSIDER (July 11, 2011), available at http:// 
www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/najib-sedition-act-to-be-repealed/. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Syed Jaymal Zahiid, National Harmony Act to Replace Sedition Act, FREE MALAYSIA 
TODAY (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2012/ 
07/11/najib-repeals-sedition-act/. 
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stated goals will have any effect on the drafting or interpretation of the future 
legislation remains to be seen. 
E.  Public Response to the ISA 
In the 1990s, the continuing misuse of the ISA and its companion laws by 
Parliament and the Prime Minister began to cause much unrest among the 
citizenry of Malaysia.  In 1998, Anwar Ibrahim, then Deputy Prime Minister, 
was arrested and imprisoned under the ISA and later convicted on corruption 
and sodomy charges in a trial widely regarded by the international 
community as politically motivated.108  This incident caused a national 
uproar and increased calls for the repeal of the ISA.109 
Although the calls for a change to Malaysia’s laws did not decrease as 
Malaysia entered the twenty-first century, the government continued to order 
arrests and detentions under the ISA.110  With Malaysia’s historically large 
and continually growing base of civil society groups, these detentions have 
received increasing coverage over the last decade, especially the high profile 
cases of the last few years.111  Three recent detentions that received high 
media coverage and caused much anger among Malaysian citizens are those 
of Raja Petra Kamarudin, editor of Malaysia Today,112 Theresa Kok, 
Member of Parliament, and Tan Hoon Cheng, a newspaper reporter.113 
                                                                                                                   
 108 Felicity Hammond, Terrorism’s Next Victim?  Judicial Review of the Malaysian Internal 
Security Act 1960, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 270, 278 (2007).  See, e.g., US Leads Chorus of 
Anwar Anger, BBC NEWS, Aug. 8, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/871814.stm; 
Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Double Injustice heaped on Anwar Ibrahim (Apr. 18, 
2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA28/015/2003/en/4794163a-fad 
8-11dd-b531-99d31a1e99e4/asa280152003en.pdf; Human Rights Watch on Malaysia: It’s Not 
Just The Trial, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 3, 1998), http://www.hrw.org/news/1998/11/01/ 
human-rights-watch-malaysia-its-not-just-trial. 
 109 Hammond, supra note 108, at 278–79. 
 110 ISA Watch, ALIRAN, http://aliran.com/isa-watch (last visited July 10, 2011). 
 111 Victor V. Ramraj, The Post-September 11 Fallout in Singapore and Malaysia: Prospects 
for an Accommodative Liberalism, 2003 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 470, 480 (discussing the 
significant involvement of civil society groups in Malaysian politics and culture); Wikileaks: 
Pressure Mounts Against Internal Security Act (ISA), MALAY. TODAY (Aug. 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/42425-wikileaks-pressure-mounts-aga 
inst-internal-security-act-isa- (discussing the mounting discontent against the ISA in late 
2008). 
 112 Royal Revolutionary Pays Price for Backing Anwar, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 
30, 2002, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/03/29/1017206152563.html. 
 113 Police Detain Teresa Kok, Sin Chew Reporter Under ISA, MALAY. TODAY (Sept. 13, 2008), 
available at http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/archives-2008/12603-police-detain-teresa-k 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013 2:29 PM 




Raja Petra Kamarudin, a Malay prince and nephew of the deceased 
former Sultan of Malaysia,114 is a well-known Malaysian blogger and 
government critic.115  He was arrested on September 12, 2008 under the ISA, 
and on September 23 he was officially detained for a period of two years.116  
His arrest and detention led to an outcry among the citizenry and politicians 
across the political spectrum in Malaysia, including the Minister for Legal 
Affairs, Zaid Ibrahim, who resigned in protest.117  The reason given for 
Kamarudin’s arrest and detention was that he had insulted Islam, therefore 
inciting racial tensions.118  However, Kamarudin’s charge that Najib, the 
Deputy Prime Minister at the time, and his wife were involved in the murder 
of a Mongolian woman was widely believed to be the real reason that the 
political establishment wanted him silenced.119  Kamarudin was freed on 
November 7, 2008 by a state court and went into self-imposed exile in May 
2009.120 
Two other arrests that happened on the same day as Kamarudins’ also 
caused public outcry against the government and the ISA; specifically the 
arrests of Teresa Kok, an Opposition Member of Parliament, and Tan Hoon 
Cheng, a reporter.   Kok was arrested and detained for allegedly asking a 
mosque to turn down the volume on its loudspeakers for the five-times-daily 
call to prayer, although the mosque publicly denied the allegation.121   Tan 
was arrested for reporting a ruling party MP’s racist statements that Chinese 
citizens of Malaysia were “squatters and therefore not entitled to rights.”122  
The bizarre nature of these detentions, one for an alleged request to turn 
down some loudspeakers and one for simply reporting the race-baiting 
remarks of another person, reaffirmed for many people that the ruling party 
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 114 Royal Revolutionary Pays Price for Backing Anwar, supra note 112. 
 115 Malaysia Detains ‘Dissent’ Writer, BBC NEWS, Sept. 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/asia-pacific/7630789.stm. 
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 117 Malaysian Blogger to Be Detained for Two Years: wife, ASSOCIATED FOREIGN PRESS, 
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 120 Raja Petra a Free Man After Court Strikes Off Appeal, MALAY MAIL, Nov. 1, 2010, 
available at http://www.mmail.com.my/content/53778-raja-petra-free-man-after-court-strikes-ap 
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 121 Why Teresa Kok is the Target, MALAY. TODAY (Oct. 4, 2008), available at http://mt.m2d 
ay.org/2008/content/view/13398/84/. 
 122 Police Detain Teresa Kok, Sin Chew Reporter Under ISA, supra note 113. 
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continued to use the ISA for purely political purposes.123  In addition, 
following her release a week after her arrest, Teresa Kok caused a stir with 
her statements about the conditions she was subjected to while under ISA 
detention, especially her comments “that she was served food that was 
‘almost like dog food.’ ”124 
The detentions and arrests described here are only a small portion of the 
arrests under the ISA in recent years.  From 1960 until 2005, police arrested 
10,662 people, with 4,139 issued formal detention orders and twelve 
executed.125 
F.  Failure of the New “Reform” Laws 
As stated above, when Najib announced that the ISA would be repealed, 
he also outlined plans for two new laws to replace the ISA; laws that would 
“take into consideration fundamental rights and freedom based on the 
Federal Constitution” and ensure “that no individual will be arrested merely 
on the point of political ideology.”126  However, Najib did state that 
preventive detentions related to terrorism and maintaining peace and well-
being would still be under the auspices of the Home Minister, and would 
therefore still be reviewed by a subservient judiciary under the subjective 
standard discussed above.127  These loopholes and the codification of certain 
offenses that previously fell under the ISA make the new laws almost worse 
than the ISA itself. 
The first of the laws that replaced the ISA is known as the Security 
Offenses (Special Measures) Bill (SOSMA), which replaces the procedural 
aspects of the ISA by limiting the detention period and providing other 
                                                                                                                   
 123 MP Free as Malaysia Tensions Grow, BBC NEWS, Sept. 19, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/asia-pacific/7625002.stm; PETITION: FREE RAJA PETRA KAMARUDDIN, TERESA KOK AND 
OTHERS HELD UNDER THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, http://www.petitiononline.com/isa1234/peti 
tion.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011); Lim Kit Siang, “Free MP Teresa Kok Perak State Assembly 
Caucus” to Be Formed Tomorrow, LIM KIT SIANG FOR MALAY. (Sept. 18, 2008, 5:59 PM), 
http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2008/09/18/%e2%80%9cfree-mp-teresa-kok-perak-state-assembly-c 
aucus%e2%80%9d-to-be-formed-tomorrow/.  
 124 Dharmender Singh, Govt to investigate Teresa Kok’s ‘dog food’ claim, STAR, Sept. 20, 
2008, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/20/nation/20080920195312&sec=natio 
n. 
 125 Shazwan Mustafa Kamal, Half a century on, Putrajaya Still Mulls ISA Reforms, 
MALAYSIAN INSIDER, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/half 
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 126 PM Announces Repeal of ISA, supra note 9.  
 127 See id. (discussing the structure of the new legislation). 
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safeguards against permanent preventive detention.128  However, a close 
reading of the SOSMA clearly shows that the new bill can easily be 
interpreted in a way that would allow the government to continue the abuses 
of the ISA era. 
A key failure of SOSMA is that the vagueness of the action required to 
trigger an arrest remains.  Any action that is prejudicial to public order or 
seeks to procure the alteration by unlawful means of established law can 
trigger an arrest under this new law.129  As discussed above, the vagueness of 
this definition has been exploited by the government in making arrests under 
the ISA, and absolutely nothing indicates that a more limited interpretation 
will be used by the Malaysian government in the future.130 
The maximum detention period has been reduced from two years under 
the ISA to twenty-eight days under SOSMA.131  Putting aside the fact that 
twenty-eight days is still a long time for a person against whom no charges 
have been filed to be confined, SOSMA includes Article 30, a provision that 
can be used to significantly increase the time of detention, perhaps for even 
longer than the ISA’s two year period.132  Entitled “Detention Pending 
Exhaustion of Legal Process,” this article allows the Public Prosecutor to ask 
the court to continue detaining an individual arrested under SOSMA even if 
that person has had a trial and been acquitted of any offense.133  Article 30 
leaves no room for discretion by the court because under this provision the 
individual must be remanded to prison for the duration of the appeals process 
upon request by the Public Prosecutor.134  This post-acquittal detention 
includes continued imprisonment while waiting for the Public Prosecutor to 
file his appeal, with no time limit for the filing prescribed under SOSMA.135  
One can easily imagine a scenario where an individual is arrested under 
SOSMA, tried and acquitted, but then held in prison while the government 
stretches the preparation of its appeal into years.  Even appeals taken with all 
                                                                                                                   
 128 Security Offenses (Special Measures) Bill 2012 (Malay.), available at http://Malaysianla 
w.my/attachments/DR152012E-Security-Offences_29735.pdf. 
 129 Id. pmbl. 
 130 See supra notes 98–99, 118–19 and accompanying text (highlighting multiple examples 
of the government’s use of the elusive language of SOMSA to consider individuals’ criticisms 
of the Malaysian government as threats to public order). 
 131 Security Offenses (Special Measures) Bill 2012, supra note 128, § 4(5). 
 132 Id. § 30. 
 133 Id. § 30(1). 
 134 Id. § 30(2). 
 135 Id. § 30(3). 
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due haste by the government can take years to be heard; take for example, 
the Home Ministry’s appeal against the High Court decision allowing 
Christian newspapers to use the word “Allah” to refer to the Christian god.136  
This appeal, surely filed as quickly as possible, has yet to be heard even 
though the case was originally decided in December 2009.137 
Finally, according to SOSMA, the repeal of the ISA holds no benefit to 
those already imprisoned under the ISA, as Article 32 specifically states that 
the repeal has no effect on previous ISA detentions.138  The forty-five 
individuals still detained under the ISA have been promised by the Home 
Minister that their cases will be reviewed individually, but the outlook is 
bleak as the Home Minister has not even begun the process.139 
The second law drafted to replace the ISA is the Penal Code 
(Amendment) Act 2012 (PCA).140  This Act amends the Malaysian Penal 
Code and codifies many of the offenses that were previously charged under 
the ISA.141  In repealing the ISA, yet using the PCA to criminalize the 
activities the ISA punished, the repeal itself begins to look effectively like a 
bait-and-switch scheme to distract the populace.142  For example, the 
extraordinarily vague offense of “commit[ting] an activity detrimental to 
parliamentary democracy” now results in a sentence “for a term which may 
extend to twenty years.”143  Considering that citizens who were on their way 
to join the aforementioned Bersih 2.0 and protest for free elections were 
arrested for “waging war against” the Sultan, the government could very 
likely stretch the definition of “commit[ting] an activity detrimental to 
parliamentary democracy” to encompass the types of “offenses” that 
routinely resulted in arrests under the ISA.144  Many other offenses 
                                                                                                                   
 136 Ding Jo-Ann, False Hope in Security Offences Act, NUT GRAPH, Apr. 23, 2012, http:// 
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 138 Security Offenses (Special Measures) Bill 2012, supra note 128, § 32. 
 139 Ida Lim, Lawyers Want PM to Revoke ISA Arrests Orders, Speed Up Change, 
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previously dealt with under the ISA are criminalized with severe penalties 
under the PCA, such as printing, possessing, or even receiving documents 
“detrimental to parliamentary democracy.”145 
III.  OTHER APPROACHES TO PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
A.  Singapore: Same Law, Different Approach 
The fact that the Constitution and laws of Malaysia and Singapore are 
largely identical naturally leads to a comparison of how Singapore has 
approached the use of preventive detention through the use of the ISA.146  
The ISA in Malaysia and the ISA in Singapore are actually the exact same 
law, acquired by Singapore through its former union with Malaysia from 
1963–1965.147  Singapore has used the law to imprison political opponents at 
times, but has been far more restrained than its northern neighbor in its use of 
the ISA, especially in the last twenty years.148  However, judicial review of 
preventive detention in Singapore has taken a very similar path to Malaysian 
judicial review, and on a very similar timeline. 
Singapore’s Constitution provides for the existence of laws, like the ISA, 
thatdeny guaranteed constitutional freedoms through the use of special 
articles in the Constitution, just like in Malaysia.149  The Constitutions of 
Malaysia and Singapore are in this regard identical, simply substituting the 
name of the country and removing references to the Sultan.150  The 
exceptions to the guaranteed freedoms for reasons of public security, racial 
harmony, and sanctity of government—the key concepts that the ISA seeks 
to protect—are all duplicated in the Singapore Constitution under Article 
149.151 
                                                                                                                   
out to overthrow the government); Penal Code Amendment Act, supra note 140, § 6. 
 145 Penal Code (Amendment) Act, supra note 140, § 6. 
 146 Damien Cheong, Enhancing National Security Through the Rule of Law: Singapore’s 
Recasting of the Internal Security Act as an Anti-Terrorism Legislation, ASIA RTS. J., Dec. 
2005 at 1, 9. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Press Statement, Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Statement on ISA (Sept. 16, 
2011), available at http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=MjA4NQ%3D%3D-Dmf5 
jullzOA%3D (demonstrating, for example, that the ISA was only used twice in Singapore 
between 1989 and 1998). 
 149 SING. CONST. arts. 149–151. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. art. 149; MALAY. CONST. arts. 149–151. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  2:29 PM 
2013]       PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN MALAYSIA 555 
 
 
This subjective standard was explicitly confirmed by the High Court, the 
lower bench of Singapore’s two-tiered Supreme Court, in the case of Lee 
Mau Seng v. Minister of Home Affairs.152  Lee Mau Seng, a newspaper 
editor, was accused of stirring up pro-Communist and pro-Chinese 
sentiments through his paper and was detained under the ISA.153  Appealing 
his claim of unlawful imprisonment to the courts,154 he was rebuffed when 
the High Court dismissed his appeal stating that “the power to issue a 
detention order has been made to depend upon the existence of a state of 
mind in the President . . . which is a purely subjective condition.”155 
Like Malaysia’s Federal Court, the Singapore Supreme Court eventually 
reconsidered this position.156  In Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, 
the Supreme Court considered the case of four individuals who were 
allegedly involved in a Marxist conspiracy to overthrow the government.157  
The detainees released a statement denying the allegations and claimed that 
no grounds existed for their detention.158  The Court of Appeal, the highest 
bench of the Singapore Supreme Court and the highest court in the country, 
decided the case based only on the narrow legal point that the Minister, who 
ordered the detention, failed to satisfy the burden of proving that the 
detention order was made with the President’s satisfaction.159  However, the 
Court also overturned the subjective standard in this opinion.160  They 
concluded that “the subjective test . . . and its progeny can no longer be 
supported and the objective test is applicable.”161  They also found that 
although the Court could not question what the executive determined to be 
necessary in cases involving national security, they were able to determine 
whether the decision made by the executive was actually based on national 
security considerations.162  The Court limited itself to the Wednesbury 
standard of review where a decision by the executive can be found invalid 
only if it is an irrational decision, defined as a decision that is “so outrageous 
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in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible 
person . . . could have arrived at it.”163   
However, even this self-limiting action by the Court could not conceal its 
attempted switch to an objective standard.  Like the Malaysian Parliament, 
the Singaporean Parliament also enacted amendments to the Internal Security 
Act that invalidated any judicial review of the Act or actions taken pursuant 
to the Act.164  Like Malaysian courts, the Singaporean courts later examined 
the validity of the amendments in a case brought by one of the unnamed 
plaintiffs in the Tze case, Teo Soh Lung.165  In that case, the Court found that 
the constitutional amendments were valid, that they clearly established a 
subjective standard for review of the ISA, and that judicial review was 
limited to procedural matters.166  The detention itself and the validity of the 
ISA belong to the discretion of the executive as determined by the 
legislature.167 
Although Singapore has followed much the same path as Malaysia 
regarding the ISA— from the judicial reaction to the law to the amendments 
making the law untouchable—Singapore has used the ISA against political 
opponents and government detractors far less frequently.168  A likely reason 
for this is Lee Kuan Yew’s near total control of the government since 
Singapore’s independence.169  In fact, “[f]ew societies have been as 
thoroughly dominated by a single man as Singapore has been dominated by 
Harry Lee Kuan Yew.”170  In addition, Singapore is dominated by a single 
majority race, with citizens of Chinese origin representing over 75% of the 
population.171  This is in contrast to Malaysia, which has a more diverse 
                                                                                                                   
 163 Id. (quoting Assoc. Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 K.B. 
223 (U.K.)). 
 164 Internal Security (Amendment) Act No. 2 1989 (Sing.). 
 165 Teo Soh Lung v. Minister of Home Affairs [1989] 2 MLJ 449, 452 (H.C. Sing.). 
 166 See id. at 452, 456–57 (interpreting International Security (Amendment) Act No. 2 1989 
(Sing.)). 
 167 Id. at 452–53. 
 168 See Statement on ISA, supra note 148, at 23 (detailing the ISA’s infrequent use). 
 169 CHRIS LYDGATE, LEE’S LAW: HOW SINGAPORE CRUSHES DISSENT 59 (2003).  Lee Kuan 
Yew was Prime Minister of Singapore from its independence in 1959 until 1990, when he 
took the Cabinet position of “Senior Minister” and then “Minister Mentor.”  Since 1968, Lee’s 
party has never held less than 95% of the seats in Singapore’s Parliament.  Lee resigned from 
government employ in May of 2011 and his eldest son is the current Prime Minister of 
Singapore.  Id.  
 170 Id. at 59–60. 
 171 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, People and Society, Singapore, https://www.cia.gov/library/pub 
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html (last updated Apr. 17, 2013) . 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  2:29 PM 
2013]       PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN MALAYSIA 557 
 
 
society comprised it approximately 50% Malays, 25% Chinese, 11% 
Indigenous, 7% Indian, and 7% Other.172  Combined with this diversity is the 
more volatile nature of Malaysian politics.173  Singapore has been dominated 
by one man since Independence, while Malaysia has had six prime ministers 
since Independence.174  While all of these prime ministers have been from 
the same ruling party, they have represented different political factions 
traditionally at conflict with one another, creating a pattern of frequent 
political challenges to party leaders, an issue that has largely been absent in 
Singapore politics.175 
This broad racial diversity and political instability led to Malaysia’s two 
most significant uses of the ISA in terms of people arrested.  One was the 
arrests after the May 13, 1969 race riots that led to the state of emergency 
discussed above.  The second was “Operasi Lalang”(translation: Weeding 
Operation) where Prime Minister Mahathir ordered the arrest of 106 
opposition leaders, dissidents, political opponents within his own party, and 
intellectuals such as the Aliran Human Rights Commission President under 
the ISA.176  Karpal Singh, the plaintiff in Karpal Singh v. Minister of Home 
Affairs discussed above, was one of the detainees arrested during this 
“Operation.”177  Like many detainees, the pretense for his arrest was his 
comments about a government plan to install non-Mandarin speaking 
principals in Mandarin schools, comments the Executive said increased 
tension between the different races in Malaysia.178 
Although the law is the same, the use of the ISA in Singapore has been 
quite different than in Malaysia.  As stated above however, those differences 
appear largely because of the political and racial factors at work in the two 
countries, and not because of legal differences in the interpretation of the 
ISA. 
                                                                                                                   
 172 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, People and Society, Malaysia, https://www.cia.gov/library/pub 
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html (last updated June 5, 2013). 
 173 KHOO BOO TEIK, BEYOND MAHATHIR: MALAYSIAN POLITICS AND ITS DISCONTENTS 6–12 
(2003). 
 174 OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA, http://www.pmo.gov.my. 
 175 KHOO, supra note 173, at 10–14. 
 176 Saravanamuttu, supra note 52; HILLEY, supra note 52, at 88–89. 
 177 Saravanamuttu, supra note 52. 
 178 Karpal Singh v. Minister for Home Affairs, [1988] 1 MLJ 468, 470–71 (H.C. Malay.). 
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B.  Canada: Guidance for Just Preventive Detention Laws 
Preventive detention is not solely a Malaysian issue.  Besides the various 
preventive detention laws passed by countries in response to terrorism during 
the last decade,179 other British colonies often had such laws, such as 
Canada’s War Measures Act of 1914.180  Canada repealed and replaced this 
Act in 1988, recognizing civic rights concerns by incorporating safeguards 
against abuse similar to those Najib claimed would be included in Malaysia’s 
ISA replacement laws.181  Given this link, the safeguards Canada included in 
its replacement law should be considered by the Malaysian government for 
inclusion in its current and future security laws.  
The War Measures Act of 1914 was enacted at the outbreak of World 
War I for the purpose of detaining aliens with familial connection to enemy 
nations.182  In total, the Act was invoked three times: once in World War I to 
intern enemy aliens; again in World War II for the same purpose (much the 
same as the United States’ internment of Japanese-Americans during World 
War II); and a third and final time in response to the ”October Crisis,” a 
domestic terrorism incident in 1970.183  Under the War Measures Act, the 
Prime Minister could proclaim an emergency, and this proclamation alone 
would be “conclusive evidence that war, invasion, or insurrection, real or 
apprehended, exist[ed].”184  The Canadian courts, like the Malaysian courts, 
were very deferential to the subjective opinion of the executive due to the 
“extraordinary times.”185   
Clearly, the War Measures Act and the judicial treatment of decisions 
made under it were very similar to the Malaysian ISA and its judicial 
response.186  In contrast to Malaysia’s strengthening of the ISA over time, 
Canada repealed the War Measures Act in 1988, replacing it with the 
Emergencies Act which incorporated safeguards against the abuse of 
                                                                                                                   
 179 Ramraj, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
 180 Kim Lane Scheppele, North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in 
Canada and the United States, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 213, 220 (2006). 
 181 Irvin Studin, Constitution and Strategy: Understanding Canadian Power in the World, 
28 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 27 (2010). 
 182 Scheppele, supra note 180, at 221. 
 183 John Ip, Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 773, 853 (2007). 
 184 Scheppele, supra note 180, at 220. 
 185 Id. at 220–21. 
 186 See supra notes 56–90 and accompanying text.  
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executive power.187  Now that the Malaysian government claims it wants to 
incorporate similar safeguards into its security laws, the Emergencies Act 
could provide a useful model for future legislation. 
The Emergencies Act severely limits the circumstances in which an 
emergency can be legitimately declared.  The act allows emergencies only in 
those situations where there exists “an urgent and critical situation of a 
temporary nature that (a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of 
Canadians . . . or (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Canadian 
Government to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of 
Canada.”188  This provision would not allow the Emergencies Act and its 
inherent powers to be invoked in many of the incidents where the Malaysian 
government invoked the ISA.189  In addition, the Emergencies Act requires 
prior consultation between the different levels of government190 and 
“reasonable grounds” to declare the emergency in the first place.191   
The Emergencies Act also gives Parliament the power to supervise and 
revoke the emergency declaration, as well as the authority to supervise all 
measures taken to combat the emergency.192  In addition, the preamble to the 
Act states that any actions taken under its provisions are subject to the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Bill of Rights, and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.193  The strong words 
of the preamble are reinforced by the fact that no exceptions or power to 
suspend these rights for any reason is found within the Emergencies Act.194  
Recall that the ISA and even the replacement laws, the SOSMA and the 
PCA, contain no such limiting language.195 
Although Canada acknowledges the need for strong legislation regarding 
times of emergency, the safeguards that it has put in place to avoid abuse of 
that emergency legislation are just as strong.  Canada’s commitment to 
human rights and the inability of its government to circumvent those rights, 
                                                                                                                   
 187 See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
 188 Emergencies Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 § 3 (Can.). 
 189 See, e.g., Why Teresa Kok is the Target, supra note 121 (discussing how Opposition MP 
Teresa Kok was detained under emergency legislation for allegedly asking a mosque to turn 
down the volume of its loudspeakers during its call to prayer, an arrest that would surely not 
survive the limiting language of the Canadian Emergencies Act, supra note 188, c. 22 § 3).  
 190 Emergencies Act, supra note 188, § 25. 
 191 Id. § 6(1). 
 192 Id. §§ 57–63. 
 193 Id. pmbl. 
 194 Scheppele, supra note 180, at 231. 
 195 Internal Security Act 1960, supra note 18; Security Offenses (Special Measures) Bill 
2012, supra note 128; Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2012, supra note 140. 
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even in times of emergency, is an example that Malaysia should look to as it 
attempts to reform its emergency legislation.   
IV.  THE WAY FORWARD FOR INCREASED FREEDOM IN MALAYSIA 
A.  Healthy Skepticism of the Government’s Promises 
The frequent use of the ISA and other so-called “emergency” laws is 
clearly an obstacle to full recognition of human rights in Malaysia, and the 
laws that have replaced the ISA are no better.  Malaysia’s history encourages 
skepticism of the Malaysia Day promise by Najib that in the future “no 
individual will be arrested merely on the point of political ideology” and that 
the power to detain and to extend preventive detentions will rest with the 
judiciary, not the executive, “except [for the] laws pertaining to terrorism.”196  
After all, when the ISA was created, the Deputy Prime Minister and the 
Prime Minister promised that the bill would only be used against 
Communists.197  Further, even Prime Minister Mahathir, who often used the 
ISA to imprison political opponents,198 spoke out against the ISA in his days 
as a backbencher Member of Parliament.199  The ways that the government 
has stretched interpretations of words in the past, most notably in Operation 
Lalang, shows that terrorism could be used as a justification in any number 
of ways to penalize any number of activities or statements.  For example, in 
2002, citizens who spread rumors of possible terrorist attacks against Kuala 
Lumpur, some of them simply by forwarding emails, were arrested under the 
ISA.200  Would this type of activity be punished under the terrorism 
exception mentioned by Najib, or considered an activity “detrimental to 
parliamentary democracy”?201  History tells us that the likely answer is yes. 
                                                                                                                   
 196 PM Announces Repeal of ISA, supra note 9. 
 197 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19. 
 198 See, e.g., Fritz & Flaherty, supra note 6, at 1357–68 (describing Mahathir’s frequent use 
of the ISA during his twenty-two-year tenure as Prime Minister to arrest political enemies 
such as his Deputy Prime Minister, Islamist party members, and journalists). 
 199 RAIS YATIM, FREEDOM UNDER EXECUTIVE POWER IN MALAYSIA: A STUDY OF EXECUTIVE 
SUPREMACY 258 (1995) (“[N]o one in his right senses like[s] the ISA.  It is in fact a negation 
of all the principles of democracy.”). 
 200 Letter to the Editor, Stop Arresting ‘Rumour-Mongers’ Under ISA!, ALIRAN, Dec. 21, 
2002, http://aliran.com/archives/ms/2002/1221.html. 
 201 Penal Code (Amendment) Act, supra note 140, § 6.  
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B.  An Appropriate Reading of Article 149 is Essential 
A major problem in restoring basic civil rights to Malaysians even after 
the planned repeal of the ISA is the historically liberal reading of Article 149 
of the Constitution and the laws created under its provisions.  The existence 
and use of the ISA and other emergency regulations such as the ISA 
replacement laws, the SOSMA and the PCA, have been justified under this 
article.202  Although a close reading of Article 149 may indicate a very 
specific purpose is required to create a law under its provisions, laws like the 
ISA and the Emergency Ordinance have since been used outside of the 
original purposes given for their creation.203  Article 149 may not be intended 
as a catch-all article on its face, but laws created under its auspices such as 
the ISA have certainly taken on that character in the years since its 
enactment.204  For proof, we need only compare the recent use of the ISA 
with its original purpose as stated by Prime Minister Abdul Rahman: to fight 
Communist subversion.205 
The Malaysian Federal Court has dismissed arguments that the ISA is 
unconstitutional or that it only applies to Communist activities because of the 
original justification for the law.206  In Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector 
Gen. of Police, the court found that the original justification for the law was 
not relevant and as long as the law is valid under Article 149, it will be held 
as valid by the court.207  Nothing in the ISA refers to Communists or 
Communist activities, thus the court found the use of the ISA was not limited 
to detention of Communists.208  Interestingly, although Najib claimed the 
SOSMA would only be used against terrorists, neither “terrorists” nor 
“terrorism” is mentioned in the SOSMA, allowing for the same type of 
verbal gymnastics to be employed by the government in future legal 
challenges against this “reform” legislation.209 
This deferential judicial treatment of the ISA casts further doubt on 
Najib’s claim that the Executive’s power to order arrests and determine 
detention lengths will be limited to terrorist activities.  Because there is no 
clear limiting language in the new laws, the government will be able to use 
                                                                                                                   
 202 PM Announces Repeal of ISA, supra note 9. 
 203 Fritz & Flaherty, supra note 6, at 1375–78. 
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 206 Fritz & Flaherty, supra note 6, at 1376–77. 
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them to imprison individuals at will and with the flimsiest of explanations.  
The government has already used similar such justifications; first for 
detaining hundreds under the ISA during Operation Lalang for “inciting 
racial tensions,210 and then for arresting Raja Petra and the Bersih 2.0 
protestors for “exciting disaffection against the government.”211 
It seems clear that the Executive’s liberal interpretations of the 
constitutional articles in question, combined with the constitutionally 
subordinate nature of the Judiciary and its general hesitancy, and near 
inability, to act as a check on government power, has led to an unjust use of 
states of emergency, the ISA, and other emergency legislation throughout 
Malaysia’s history. 
C.   Changing the Constitution 
One solution to Malaysia’s problem would be to change the Constitution 
itself to put additional safeguards or restrictions into the articles that give the 
government so much unrestrained power.  The Malaysian Constitution can 
be amended with a two-thirds vote of the Parliament.212  Parliament amends 
the Constitution often; it added a total of 643 amendments to individual 
articles from 1957 to 2003, including the amendments curtailing the power 
of the courts and subjugating them to the Legislature.213 
However, it seems unlikely that the Parliament will decide to amend 
Article 149 to give itself less power, especially considering how the 
Executive and the ruling party have behaved since Malaysia’s Independence, 
as evidenced by the uses of the ISA described above.214  In addition, the 
ruling party lost its two-thirds majority in 2008, and it is unknown whether 
the ruling party will recapture it or whether the opposition party will 
someday reach a supermajority.  While the constitutional amendment method 
is very difficult to follow due to the strong political will and power needed, it 
                                                                                                                   
 210 See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text (discussing Operation Lalang). 
 211 See supra notes 99, 101 and accompanying text (discussing the arrest of Raja Petra and 
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 212 MALAY. CONST. art. 159(3). 
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may be necessary to build a strong safeguard against the abuse of executive 
power. 
D.  Restoration of the Judiciary 
The impracticality of amending the Constitution also raises the question 
of judicial independence.  After all, Najib stated in his Malaysia Day speech 
that “power to extend the detention period will shift from the executive to 
[the] judiciary.”215  However, as discussed above, the Constitution has been 
amended so that the power of the courts is subordinate to that of the 
legislature, and by extension the executive.  Thus even if the power of 
detention is shifted to the judiciary, there is nothing to stop the legislature 
and the executive from exerting their constitutional powers to ensure that 
certain detentions are extended.  What will stop the judiciary itself from 
extending those detentions it knows to be of importance to the executive, 
simply to avoid such pressure being applied?  The answer as of now is 
nothing.  The legislature and the executive are still superior in power to the 
judiciary under the Constitution, and the judiciary serves, in effect, at the 
pleasure of the legislature.216  This subservience prevents true judicial 
independence, and will therefore prevent the judiciary from independently 
reviewing the legitimacy of the SOSMA, the PCA, the proposed National 
Harmony Act, and any other security laws passed in the future. 
Even if Najib does not use the new laws as he and his predecessors have 
used the ISA, the fact that the courts are constitutionally subordinate to the 
legislature gives the executive a power that could be used unscrupulously by 
a future prime minister.  Amending the Constitution to restore constitutional 
power to the courts must be the first step in creating a new rule of law in 
Malaysia; and Malaysia can look to developed nations to see that their rules 
of law are built on strong and independent court systems.  Restoring the 
judiciary to its rightful role as intended by the original Constitution is even 
more important than repealing the ISA.217 
E.  Public Commitment to Human Rights Through Treaties 
A cosmetic change that could show the Malaysian people and the world 
that the government intends to commit to the protection of human rights in 
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the future would be the signing of international human rights agreements.218  
Of the nine core international human rights treaties, Malaysia has signed and 
ratified only three: those concerning gender equality, the rights of the child, 
and the rights of disabled persons.219  Malaysia has not signed any of the 
treaties relating to racial discrimination, civil and political rights, economic 
and social rights, migrant workers’ rights, or freedom from enforced 
disappearance or torture.220  Signing these treaties and moving towards full 
acceptance of the international human rights regime221 would be a strong 
signal that Najib’s words are not just another smokescreen.  
F.   Strict Limitations on the Use of Preventive Detention in the New Laws 
Restoring the rightful role of the judiciary is only the first step in 
reforming the ISA and other laws that have been abused in Malaysia.  The 
process of repeal and replace has failed so far.  Even the new laws, the 
SOSMA and the PCA, must be reworked under a review and 
recommendation process that looks to other nations to ensure that the new 
legal regime reflects international norms on preventive detention.  Canada 
and its Emergencies Act is a good example to look at because it allows the 
executive to use strong powers during an emergency, but limits the abuse of 
those powers in other situations.  The strict requirements for a situation to be 
qualified as an emergency, the parliamentary supervision, and the inherent 
subordination of the act to Canadian and international civil rights 
conventions222 ensure that the Emergencies Act can only be used for the 
reason it was created: true national emergencies.  The bending and twisting 
of the ISA and the Constitution that has permitted the executive to imprison 
people for reading poems or for requesting that a mosque turn down its 
loudspeakers must stop.223  The vague language continuously employed in 
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Malaysian security and emergency legislation must be rejected wholesale, 
while forthcoming laws are crafted and existing laws are reworked to contain 
very specific powers and limitations, narrowly defining the circumstances in 
which suspension of individual rights will be permitted.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The period of reform ushered in by Prime Minister Najib’s Malaysia Day 
speech in 2011 may yet prove to be a watershed moment in the political and 
social history of Malaysia.  It may, however, be rendered meaningless by 
continued abuses of executive power under the Security Offenses Act, the 
Penal Code Act, the proposed National Harmony Act, and other new laws to 
be ushered in over the next few years.  Najib’s pledge of reform is a bold 
one, but the history of Malaysian use of executive power is replete with 
instances of prime ministers promising not to use preventive detention laws 
unjustly; a promise they quickly break by imprisoning political opponents or 
people who have committed no real crimes.  The true test of Najib’s reform 
agenda is not what laws he chooses to repeal, but rather what he replaces 
them with, and so far his replacement laws have fallen far short of his 
promise.  Future laws must contain strong protections of civil liberties and 
the rights of the person in order to be considered truly fair and just by the 
Malaysian citizenry and the international community.  
To further ensure that civil liberties and human rights are protected in the 
future, Malaysia should also amend its Constitution to remove the articles 
that allow extreme laws like the ISA to exist.  At a bare minimum, it must 
amend the Constitution to correct the mistakes of 1989 and restore the 
judiciary to its rightful constitutional role: that of the third branch of 
government and a check and balance on the activities of both the legislature 
and the executive.  To leave the judiciary in a subservient position supports a 
form of government that allows any number of abuses of power to take 
place. 
History will tell if Najib’s speech on September 15, 2011, bears any 
significance either as mere window dressing for a bait-and-switch political 
ploy or as a signal that it truly ushered in a new era for Malaysia.  The hope 
is that Malaysia can overcome the colonial-era mindset embodied in the ISA 
and its successor laws, which denies basic human rights in favor of 
expansive government detention power.  Achieving this goal will allow 
Malaysians to move forward and address, together, all of the other issues that 
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are preventing Malaysia from becoming a truly developed country and an 
example of real democracy among the Asian nations. 
